Previous research suggests that the random coefficients logit is a highly flexible model that overcomes the problems of the homogeneous logit by allowing for differences in tastes across individuals. The purpose of this paper is to show that this is not true. We prove that the random coefficients logit imposes restrictions on individual choice behavior that limit the types of substitution patterns that can be found through empirical analysis, and we raise fundamental questions about when the model can be used to recover individuals' preferences from their observed choices.
Introduction
Consider a situation in which the same choice set is presented three different ways to a group of decision makers. On the first occasion, the choice set includes two alternatives. Denote this set as {A,B}. On the second occasion, a duplicate for alternative A is added to the choice set, so the set becomes {A,A,B}. On the third occasion, a duplicate for alternative B is added to the original set, so the choice set becomes {A,B,B}. Suppose 60 out of 100 individuals choose alternative A on all three occasions. What do these choices reveal about the individuals' preferences? Observing these data, it would seem reasonable to infer that the individuals' preferences do not depend on how the alternatives are displayed in the choice set. In other words, the individuals have rational preferences. Surprisingly, estimating a random coefficients logit on these data would not lead us to this conclusion.
The purpose of this paper to show that the random coefficients logit is a less flexible model than previous research suggests. We prove that the random coefficients logit imposes restrictions on individual choice behavior that limit the types of substitution patterns that can be found through empirical analysis. It implies that overall demand for an alternative must rise if a perfect substitute for it is added to the choice set. This means that a group of individuals cannot behave rationally across different presentations of a choice set. It also imposes disproportionate substitution patterns among market shares rather than recovers them from the data. To help explain our analytical results, we discuss why the population correlations found in the model do not overcome the problems associated with IIA, as previous research suggests [e.g. Berry et al., 1995 , Nevo, 2001 , Train, 2009 , and why the McFadden and Train [2000] theorem has limited implications for empirical analysis.
Part of the misunderstanding about the random coefficients logit can be attributed to the lack of cross-level inference 1 in previous research. To overcome this deficiency, we design several Monte Carlo experiments to show what the model predicts both about individual and population choice behavior. In the first two experiments, we explore what the model predicts when it is estimated on data in which individuals behave rationally, as they are presumed to actually behave. We show that the random coefficients logit results in biased parameter estimates that lead us to very different conclusions about individual preferences depending on how alternatives are presented in the choice set. For example, in one experiment, we infer that an individual would need a 0.26 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight if the model is estimated on data in which choices are displayed one way, whereas the same individual would need 2.36 GHz increase in processor speed if they are displayed another. This occurs even though the individual has rational preferences and is observed to make consistent choices across the two presentations.
We show that this finding has implications for policy analysis too, as the bias in parameter estimates compounds upon itself when evaluating counterfactual scenarios. In one experiment, the market share predictions for a given alternative in a given choice set range between 17% and 83% depending on how the alternatives are displayed in the data used for estimation and in the counterfactual scenario under consideration. This occurs even though the market share observed in the data is always about 50% regardless of how the alternatives are displayed.
We conclude by showing what the random coefficients logit leads us to believe when it is estimated on data in which individuals behave with IIA. Paradoxically, we infer that individuals' preferences do not change across presentations in this case. This occurs even though their observed choices suggest that they do.
The Similarity Critique

Individual Substitution Patterns
Consider the example proposed by Steenburgh [2008] to recall the long-standing argument against models with IIA. An individual faces a choice between two MacBook computers:
Weight Processor Speed MacBook A 3 lbs 2.0 GHz MacBook B 6 lbs 3.0 GHz MacBook A is the lighter alternative, but it runs at a slower speed; MacBook B is faster, but heavier.
Assume the individual chooses MacBook A with probability 3 /5. Now suppose a third alternative, MacBook B , is added to the choice set. MacBook B is identical to MacBook B, with the prime being used simply for clarity in this example. It weighs 6 lbs and runs at 3.0 GHz. 2 Thus, the individual would be equally likely to choose either MacBook B or MacBook B if she were asked to choose between just the two of them. What would happen if the individual is presented with a choice among all three alternatives?
The original argument made by Debreu [1960] follows from rational choice theory, which imposes an element of consistency on individual preferences and choice behavior. Rationality presumes that an individual's preference between any two alternatives does not depend on how they are presented in the choice set. For this to occur, MacBook A would need to be chosen with probability 3 /5, MacBook B with probability 1 /5, and MacBook B with probability 1 /5 if the perfect substitute is added to the choice set. This substitution pattern is consistent with rational choice theory because the individual prefers the light MacBook regardless of whether the choice set is displayed as {A,B} or as {A, B, B }.
The objection to models with IIA is that they do not allow rational substitution to occur. By definition, a model with IIA requires the ratio of any two choice probabilities to remain the same no matter what other alternatives are included in the choice set. If the individual behaves with IIA, MacBook A would be chosen with probability 3 /7, MacBook B with probability 2 /7, and MacBook B with probability 2 /7. The probability that a fast MacBook is chosen would rise from 2 /5 in the original set to 4 /7 in the set that contains a perfect substitute. This new substitution pattern, however, is at odds with rational choice theory because the individual's preference between a light and a fast MacBook now depends on how the alternatives are displayed. The individual prefers the light MacBook when presented with the choice set {A, B}, yet prefers the fast MacBook when presented with the choice set {A, B, B }. Similar arguments have been made by Savage [Luce and Suppes, 1965] , Tversky [1972] , and McFadden [1974] , among others.
While it is commonly understood that IIA is an undesirable property and we want to use models that do not possess it, it seems to be overlooked that simply breaking IIA is not sufficient to ensure that rational substitution occurs. To clarify this idea, consider the following example. Suppose a third model implies that MacBook A would be chosen with probability 1 /5, MacBook B with probability 2 /5, and MacBook B with probability 2 /5 when MacBook B is added to the choice set. This new model clearly breaks IIA. But again, the individual prefers the light MacBook when presented with the choice set {A, B}, yet prefers the fast MacBook when presented with the choice set {A, B, B }. In fact, this model is even more objectionable than the one with IIA because an even smaller proportion of the entrant's choice probability (0% as opposed to 40%) is drawn from the perfect substitute, and the overall probability that a faster MacBook is chosen rises by an even greater amount (an increase from 2 /5 to 4 /5 as opposed to an increase from 2 /5 to 4 /7) when the perfect substitute is added to the set.
In short, the goal in developing choice models should not be just to break IIA. Rather, it should be to allow rational substitution to occur.
A few additional points are worth noting. First, it is common to discuss the substitution patterns implied by a model rather than the choice probabilities themselves. This is for convenience, as the substitution patterns merely represent how the choice probabilities change across the two choice sets. We will use the following terms to describe the two aforementioned patterns: An individual exhibits rational substitution if 100% of the entrant's choice probability is drawn from its perfect substitute and 0% is drawn from the other alternatives. Although they have not previously been named, it is well accepted that these ratios represent the desired substitution patterns when a perfect substitute is added to the choice set. An individual exhibits proportional substitution if the entrant's choice probability is drawn from each of the original alternatives in proportion to their choice probabilities. In the previous example, when the individual behaves with IIA and exhibits proportional substitution, 60% of the entrant's choice probability is drawn from MacBook A and 40% is drawn from MacBook B.
Second, although we refer to the desired substitution patterns as rational, there is little disagreement between rational and behavioral economists on this point. For example, in the behavioral economics literature, Tversky [1972] paraphrases the Beethoven / Debussy example proposed in Debreu [1960] to motivate the elimination-by-aspects choice model. Likewise, in the microeconomics literature, the rational substitution patterns are often described as being either more intuitive or more realistic.
Population Substitution Patterns
Rational Substitution
Prior research suggests that the random coefficients logit is a highly flexible model that overcomes the problems of the logit because it allows for differences in tastes across individuals [e.g. Berry et al., 1995 , Nevo, 2001 , Train, 2009 . It has been suggested that the random coefficients logit allows more realistic substitution patterns to be found among market shares, and some prior research even conjectures that the random coefficients logit can recover any substitution pattern that exists in the data [e.g. Train, 1999 , Nevo, 2001 , Train, 2009 . Although the random coefficients logit implies that individuals behave with IIA, perhaps this is not a concern so long as the researcher's interest centers around only the population's choice behavior.
We show that the random coefficients logit model is less flexible than previous research suggests.
First, it implies that overall demand for an alternative must rise if a perfect substitute for it is added to the choice set. Demand rises for every individual in the population, and therefore it must rise for the population as a whole. This means that a population of decision makers cannot exhibit the desired, rational choice behavior even if tastes do vary across individuals. Second, the random coefficients logit implies that disproportionately greater substitution must occur regardless of how individuals truly behave in the data. This means that the random coefficients logit is not recovering more realistic substitution patterns from the observed data; quite to the contrary, it is imposing them.
The following example helps illustrate this point. The market share of each MacBook is a property of the population. It can be thought of as the probability that an individual chosen at random from the population chooses a given MacBook. Thus, the market share of MacBook A is Pr {A} = Pr {A|Saleperson} Pr {Saleperson} + Pr {A|Scientist} Pr {Scientist}. Taken together, these assumptions imply the following choice probabilities:
Again suppose a third alternative identical to MacBook B, weighing 6.0 lbs and running at 3.0 GHz, is added to the choice set. If the individuals were to exhibit rational substitution, the following choice probabilities and market shares would occur:
MacBook B (or 65%) in the set with a perfect substitute. Expressed in terms of substitution patterns, only 54%
of the demand for the entrant is drawn from its perfect substitute, whereas we would expect 100%
to be drawn.
The following theorem asserts that this is true in general:
Theorem 1. If individuals behave with IIA, overall demand for an alternative must increase if a perfect substitute for it is added to the choice set. This occurs for every individual in the population, and therefore occurs for the population as a whole, regardless of whether individuals' tastes are different.
Proof. It suffices to consider a choice between two alternatives. Suppose individual n chooses one alternative with probability P n and a composite of other alternatives with probability (1 − P n ).
Make no assumptions about the individuals' tastes, so the P n can vary across individuals.
Suppose a perfect substitute for the first alternative is added to the choice set. Since individuals behave with IIA, the new choice probabilities satisfy k n P n + k n P n + k n (1 − P n ) = 1, where k n is a constant that rescales the original choice probabilities. This implies k n = 1 /(1+Pn).
An individual is more likely to pick the alternative with a perfect substitute in the expanded choice set if 2k n P n > P n . This occurs if P n < 1, which is obviously true.
Since every individual is more likely to choose the alternative with a perfect substitute, the market share of that alternative must increase too.
At first blush, this theorem seems to be at odds with Theorem 1 of McFadden and Train [2000, p. 451] , which shows that a mixed logit can approximate any random utility model to any desired degree of accuracy. As will be shown in section 3, however, the theorem in McFadden and Train has more limited implications than previous research suggests.
Disproportionately Greater Substitution
Even though the population does not exhibit rational substitution in the example, it is interesting to note that a disproportionately greater percentage of the entrant's market share is drawn from its pre-existing substitute. We may wonder whether this is always the case with the random coefficients logit. If so, observing this pattern in empirical analysis is not evidence of the random coefficients logit's ability to recover more realistic substitution patterns that exist in the data. The following theorem asserts that this is true in general:
Theorem 2. Consider a population of decision makers who behave with IIA and whose tastes vary across individuals. An new alternative must draw a greater proportion of its market share from its perfect substitute, even though each individual in the population exhibits proportional substitution.
Proof. It suffices to consider a choice between two alternatives. Suppose individual n chooses one alternative with probability P n and a composite of the other alternatives with probability (1−P n ).
Suppose a perfect substitute for the first alternative is added to the choice set. Since individuals behave with IIA, the choice probability of the first alternative changes by P n − k n P n = (1 − k n ) P n , where k n = 1/ (1 + P n ) as before. (IIA implies that each individual exhibits proportional substitution, so for each individual the proportion of the entrant's choice probability that is drawn from its
The market share of the first good in the original choice set is S = 1 N ∀n P n , the change in its market share between choice sets is ∆ = 1 N ∀n
(1 − k n ) P n , and the market share of each perfect substitute in the expanded choice set is S = 1 N ∀n k n P n . We want to show that the market share of the entrant is disproportionately drawn from its perfect substitute: ∆ /S > S, which occurs if
If we order the individuals such that
Chebyshev's sum inequality implies that
If the population has heterogeneous tastes, such that P 1 > P n , then
which completes the proof.
Notice too, however, that if the population has homogeneous tastes, such that P 1 = P 2 = . . . = P n = P as the logit model suggests, then
P n , which implies that the population exhibits proportional substitution because
The proof can be understood intuitively as follows: k n P n is the probability that individual n chooses the entrant, and P n is the proportion of this probability drawn from the perfect substitute. Thus, the individuals who are most likely to choose the entrant are also the individuals who draw the greatest proportion of demand from the perfect substitute. Chebyshev's sum inequality states that the demand drawn from the perfect substitute under this arrangement, ∀n (k n P n ) P n , is at least as great as the demand that would have been drawn from the perfect substitute if every individual in the population were to substitute away by the average amount,
Returning to the example, suppose the population consisted of one hundred Salespeople and one From one perspective, Theorem 2 seems to suggest that the random coefficients logit represents a step in the right direction. We may object to the fact that each individual exhibits proportional substitution, but the population as a whole is guaranteed to substitute among the alternatives in a way that is more in line with our expectations about how it should behave. Perhaps the model is adequate if interest centers around only the population's choice behavior. We will take up this issue through Monte Carlo simulations in section 4.
Nevertheless, as will be discussed further in the next section, Theorem 2 is a bit unsettling in its resemblance to the ecological fallacy, which describes situations in which the behavior of an individual and the behavior of a population do not correspond [Robinson, 1950] . The theorem implies that the substitution behavior of each individual must differ from that of the population. Furthermore, prior research suggests that the flexibility of the random coefficients logit model allows it to capture more realistic substitution patterns that occur in the data. As it turns out, the opposite is true.
The random coefficients logit imposes disproportionately greater substitution on the population regardless of the observed choice behavior. These patterns are a mathematical consequence of the model.
The Random Coefficient Logit
In this section, we derive the standard random coefficients logit model, draw a parallel with the earlier work of Robinson [1950] to discuss the relationship between the population correlations and the individual choice behavior, and discuss the implications of the McFadden and Train [2000] theorem. The broader purpose is to help explain why prior work has come to different conclusions about the substitution patterns of the random coefficients logit.
The Model
The random coefficients logit generalizes the homogeneous logit by allowing tastes to vary across individuals. The term "random" coefficients is misleading in the sense that it does not imply that an individual's tastes randomly fluctuate across occasions. Nor does it imply anything about parameter uncertainty.
3 Rather, the term simply implies that tastes are modeled as varying across individuals in the population.
The first step in building a random coefficients logit is to define the relationship between an individual's observed choices and his or her preferences. An individual's preferences are represented with an additively separable utility function that is decomposed into two components. The utility of individual n on occasion t from alternative j is specified as
The first component, x tj β n , is referred to as the observed utility. It is a function of the observed attributes of each alternative on each occasion, x tj , and the individual's tastes for those attributes, β n . The second component, ε ntj , is referred to as the unobserved utility. It is a random variable that accounts for factors other than the observed attributes that affect the individual's utility.
4
Central to the present discussion, since the unobserved utilities are assumed to be independent and identically distributed across alternatives according to a type-I extreme value distribution, they are uncorrelated at the individual level of the model.
The link between the individual's utility and observed choice behavior is established by assuming that the individual chooses the alternative that provides the greatest utility. The decision rule governing his or her behavior is to choose alternative j on a given occasion if and only if u ntj > u ntk ∀k = j.
Conditional on the observed attributes and the individual's tastes, the probability that individual n chooses alternative j on occasion t is
where y ntj is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the alternative is chosen and the value zero otherwise. These are the well-known logit choice probabilities, which imply that each individual behaves with IIA.
Putting these terms together, we can construct the multinomial logit probability mass function
where y nt is a vector whose elements are y ntj . This is the basic building block of all subsequent models, so to simplify notation from this point forward we will write
when the observed choices are generated according to this distribution.
The next step is to model how tastes vary across individuals in the population. In the case of a random coefficient logit, the tastes are commonly assumed to follow a multivariate normal distribution and the model is specified as
The same model can be written in mixed-effects form by expressing the individuals' tastes in terms of differences from the mean tastes in the population. Defining δ n ≡ β n − θ, the model becomes
The mixed-effects form is popular in the social sciences and can be useful for analysis [Gelman and Hill, 2007, pp. 264-265] , but it should be clear that equations (5) and (6) are equivalent expressions.
In contrast to the random coefficients logit, the homogeneous logit assumes that the tastes of every individual in the population are the same. The homogeneous logit requires a single level and is written as
It is analogous to classical regression model in the sense that the observed choices can be pooled across individuals when estimating tastes.
Population (Ecological) Correlations and Individual Choice Behavior
Prior research [e.g. Berry et al., 1995 , Nevo, 2001 , Train, 2009 suggests that the problem with the homogeneous logit is that the random component of utility, which includes just ε, is both additively separable from the observed utility and is independent and identically distributed. It argues that the lack of correlation gives rise to the IIA property and its restrictive substitution patterns, whereas the random coefficients logit overcomes this issue because it possesses a random component of utility that is no longer independent of the observed product attributes and can change depending on the similarity of the alternatives in the choice set. The purpose of this section is to make clear that these population correlations do not imply that the problems with IIA have been solved. Train [2009, p. 139] shows that population (ecological) correlations exist in the random coefficients logit as follows. Beginning with the mixed effects specification in equation (6), a composite component of random utility is formed by defining η ntj ≡ x tj δ n + ε ntj . This quantity treats the variation in tastes across individuals as being random in addition to the unobserved utility. Correlations between different alternatives exist in the composite random utility, as the covariance between η ntj and η ntk is
σ ·tjk is a function of Σ because it is determined by integrating over the distribution of tastes in the population, and therefore it is a property of the population as opposed to a property of an individual. Correlations between different alternatives exist even if Σ is a diagonal matrix, which it is often assumed to be.
Although correlations now exist at the population level of the model, this does not mean that these are the right correlations. The ecological fallacy should make us cautious about assuming that these correlations correct any problems at the individual-level. Robinson [1950] , the study that One reason is that some prior research wrongly determines the individual choice probabilities. For example, Train [2009, Ch. 6 ] asserts that the individual choice probabilities in a random coefficient logit would be
for the model in equation (5). It makes the argument (pp. 137-139) that the individual choice probabilities in equation (3) are conditional on β n , which is unobserved by the researcher. If the researcher observed β n , then the choice probabilities of the random coefficients logit would be same as those of the homogeneous logit, since the ε ntj are iid extreme value. But the researcher does not know β n , and thus must integrate over all possible values that it may take.
This argument, however, is incorrect because it confuses the concept of parameter uncertainty with the concept of taste variation. The quantity in equation (9) is not the probability that individual n chooses alternative j on occasion t. While it is true that the researcher does not observe any individual decision maker's tastes (β n ) in the random coefficients logit, it is also true that the researcher does not observe any individual's tastes in the homogeneous logit. If this argument were true, the homogeneous logit would not possess IIA either. In fact, not all of the parameter uncertainty has been accounted in equation (9) because the probability is still conditional on the population level parameters θ and Σ. As it turns out, the individual choice probability is correctly stated in equation (3), whereas the quantity in equation (9) is akin to a market share.
Another reason for this belief is that many studies never quantify the individual choice probabilities because they either cannot or do not conduct cross-level inference. For example, Berry et al. [1995] and Nevo [2001] proceed by estimating the random coefficients logit on market share data, which makes it impossible to draw individual-level inference. But even when individual-level data are used to estimate the model, the individual-level parameters are often treated as nuisance variables and disregarded. For example, Revelt and Train [1998] and Brownstone and Train [1999] proceed by evaluating the likelihood function
This approach to estimation makes it impossible to make statements about the individual choice probabilities because the individual decision maker's tastes (β n ) are integrated out of the likelihood.
The substantive focus of previous research partially explains the lack of cross-level inference. The quantity of interest in these and many other studies is the market share, a population-level quantity.
Nevertheless, as we will show through Monte Carlo experiments, assumptions about individual choice behavior can matter in inference even if the ultimate objective is to learn about population-level quantities. We make this clear by taking a fully Bayesian approach to estimation. For example, to estimate the model in equation (5), we simulate from the joint posterior density
and draw inference about both the individual-level parameters (β) and population-level parameters (θ and Σ). This enables us to draw conclusions about the individual choice probabilities as well as the population market shares.
Implications of the McFadden-Train Theorem
The McFadden and Train [2000] theorem is often used to justify the specification of a random coefficient logit [Train, 1998 , Revelt and Train, 1998 , Nevo, 2000 , 2001 , Chintagunta et al., 2003 , Erdem et al., 2008 . Although it is commonly agreed that the theorem proves that a random coefficients logit is an extremely flexible model, some disagreement does seem to exist about what the theorem specifically shows. Sometimes it is argued that the theorem shows that a random coefficients logit can approximate any random utility model to any desired degree of accuracy [e.g. Train, 1998 ]. Other times it is argued that the theorem shows that the model allows for a flexible pattern of substitution at the aggregate level, but it imposes IIA at the individual level [e.g. Erdem et al., 2008] . Train [1999 Train [ , 2009 provide an intuitive explanation of the proof.
The purpose of this section is to clarify what McFadden and Train [2000] theorem means and to
show that its implications are more limited for empirical analysis than previous research suggests.
We begin by noting that although no distinction seems to be made between a mixed and a random coefficients logit in the literature, the theorem encompasses a broader class of models than just the random coefficients logit. Specifically, the theorem defines any model that can be written in the form
as a mixed logit. The theorem formally considers only a single choice occasion, so we will drop the t subscript.
Following the discussion in Train [1999, p. 128 ], we will begin by assuming that all individuals have the same tastes. While this may seem to be a strange starting point, the theorem is meant to encompass models of this form too. Not only does this assumption explicitly make the point that finding the right mixing distribution requires more than finding the right distribution of tastes across individuals, but it also avoids any confusion that might arise about the difference between individual choice probabilities and population market shares, as discussed in the previous section.
Consider the following example. Suppose the true random utility model is
where x j represents the observed attributes of alternative j, α is a constant representing an individual's tastes, and η nj is the unobserved utility.
Conditional on α and η nj , the individual's choices would be deterministic.
where I (·) is the indicator function.
The true choice probability is found by integrating over all possible values that η may take, such that
The goal of the proof is to find a mixed logit that is able to approximate this choice probability arbitrarily closely. Consider the following transformation. Rescale the original utility function by 1 /λ and then add an iid extreme value term, such that
The re-scaling of utility does not change the model, but the addition of the extreme value term does. The extreme value term, however, is added to the model because doing so produces choice probabilities of the form
which satisfy the McFadden and Train [2000] definition of a mixed logit. The theorem then shows that as λ → 0, then P j approximates Q j arbitrarily closely. It is in this sense that a mixed logit can approximate any random utility model to any desired degree of accuracy.
Although the suggested transformation does allow the choice probabilities of the true model to be expressed in the form of a mixed logit, it is less clear that this is a useful transformation for empirical analysis. The theorem makes no distinction between the randomness of the coefficients and randomness of the errors, as the mixing distribution includes both terms. Thus, not only does the researcher need to choose the right distribution for the random coefficients α (which we did in this example by implicitly assuming that all individuals have the same tastes), but the researcher also has to choose the right distribution for random errors η too. But if the researcher knew that all individuals had the same tastes and that the errors were distributed according to a uniform distribution, there would be no need to approximate the true random utility model with a mixed logit. The true random utility model could simply be written down. The transformation required in the proof puts the choice probabilities in the right form, but it does not make the problem any easier to solve.
In other words, the flexibility implied by the theorem is simply that any random utility model can be expressed in the form of a mixed logit. It does not show that the random coefficients logit specified in equation (5) can approximate any substitution pattern, which seems to be the rationale given in prior research.
Summarizing our analytical results, we have shown that the random coefficients logit is much less flexible than previous research suggests. Not only does it impose IIA at the individual level of the model, but it also imposes specific substitution patterns at the population level, as shown by Theorems 1 and 2. Part of the confusion surrounding this random coefficients logit stems from the fact many empirical studies have made assumptions about what the model predicts without quantifying behavior through cross-level inference. We now turn our attention to this problem and discuss its implications for counterfactual analysis.
Monte Carlo Choice Experiments
In this section, we design three Monte Carlo experiments to answer questions about the random coefficients logit. In the first two experiments, we ask, "what does the random coefficients logit predict when individuals behave rationally?" In the first experiment, we simplify the problem by assuming that individuals' tastes fall into two segments. This makes it easy to quantify what the model predicts about both individual and population choice behavior. In the second, we generalize the problem by assuming that tastes are normally distributed across individuals. We show that the model predicts the same types of substitution patterns in this case, and we discuss the implication of our findings for policy analysis, which is of particular interest because the random coefficients logit is often used in structural models of demand. In the third experiment, we ask, "what does the random coefficients logit predict when individuals behave with IIA?"
We take a Monte Carlo approach to the problem for a few reasons. First, it allows us to know how individuals actually behave when making choices as opposed to having to assume it, as we would in a study of real subjects. Also, we can simulate as many choices for each individual in the population as desired, which means we can come to very accurate estimates of individual tastes.
We design the experiments by elaborating on the example discussed in section 2. A population of decision makers is asked to make a series of choices among different configurations of MacBooks, but these choices are presented under three different conditions. In condition A, individuals are asked to choose between two MacBooks. In condition B, a perfect substitute for the lightweight MacBook is added to the choice set, whereas in condition C, a perfect substitute for the high-speed MacBook is added. We observe individuals making very different choices and find that the model leads us to very different conclusions depending on whether individuals behave rationally or with IIA. Next, we determine the individual choice probabilities. In condition A, the same choice probabilities would arise no matter whether an individual behaves rationally or with IIA because the data contain only two alternatives. Thus, we determine the choice probabilities by assuming that individuals make decisions according to a multinomial logit process. For example, if a Salesperson faces a decision between the following set of MacBooks {(3 lbs, 2 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)}, we determine the choice probabilities to be { 2 /3, 1 /3}.
In conditions B and C, we need to make an additional behavioral assumption in order to determine the choice probabilities. In this experiment, we assume that individuals behave rationally, so that their choices would reveal a consistent set of preferences across the three conditions. Thus, in condition B, when the Salesperson faces a choice among {(3 lbs, 2 GHz), (3 lbs, 2 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)}, we determine the choice probabilities to be { 1 /3, 1 /3, 1 /3}. Although a second lighter
MacBook is presented in the choice set, the chance that a Salesperson chooses a lighter alternative remains 2 /3. Table 1 contains a summary of the choice probabilities used to generate data.
Finally, we generate choices. We suppose that the population consists of 100 Salespeople and 100
Scientists, and we design the experiment such that each individual faces ten repetitions of nine unique choice sets in each condition. This results in 200 individuals making 90 choices in each of three conditions. This design generates enough data to alleviate concerns about sample size when estimating the individual taste parameters, yet enables us to conveniently summarize the observed choices. Table 2 contains a summary of the observed choices.
Central to this experiment, individuals are assumed to behave rationally, so the observed choices should reveal a consistent set of preferences across the three conditions. For example, choice set Since the individuals in this experiment make consistent choices across the conditions, the population as a whole makes consistent choices too. For example, the population's choices should reveal a preference for the faster MacBook in choice set (viii), and its observed market share is 62.6% (1,251 times in 2,000 occasions), 60.4% and 61.9% across the three conditions. Furthermore, the population's choices should reveal indifference between a lighter and faster MacBook in choice set (iv), and the market share of the lighter MacBook is 49.9%, 50.7% and 50.5% across the three conditions.
These are ideal data sets on which to test the random coefficients logit. Both the individuals' and the population's choices reveal a consistent set of preferences regardless of how the alternatives are displayed, so it seems reasonable to expect that random coefficients logit model would lead us to the same inference about the individuals' preferences regardless of the data set on which it is estimated.
Model and Results
To infer the individuals' tastes from their observed choices, we estimate the following random coefficients logit model:
where z n represents the vector of observed demographic characteristics of individual n. This vector is specified with two elements, an intercept common to all individuals and a job type specific to each individual. We standardize job-type such that it takes the value -0.9975 if the individual is a
Salesperson and the value 0.9975 if the individual is a Scientist. 7 This and all subsequent models are estimated using bayesm, an open-source software package in the R programming language [Rossi et al., 2005] .
The population-level regression results are reported in Table 3 . The random coefficients logit is able to recover every individual's tastes when estimated on Data Set A. This is not surprising in that no difference exists between rational and IIA choice behavior when only two alternatives are displayed in the choice set. Nevertheless, the random coefficients logit leads us astray when estimated on the other data sets. In Data Set B, which includes a perfect substitute for the lightweight alternative, the random coefficients logit underestimates every individual's taste for weight (average taste of -0.198 in B vs. a true value of -0.347) and overestimates their taste for speed (average taste of 1.54
in B vs. a true value of 1.04). In Data Set C, which includes a perfect substitute for the high-speed alternative, the opposite occurs, as the random coefficients logit underestimates every individual's taste for speed and overestimates their taste for weight.
We show this bias graphically in to the lower left-hand corner of the panel because the random coefficients logit underestimates the value that both Salespeople and Scientists place on processor speed relative to weight.
7 The bayesm software requires the hierarchical variables to be standardized.
We quantify the magnitude of the trade-off that each type of individual would be willing to make between weight and speed in The troubling aspect of this experiment is that the observed choices imply that the individuals' preferences do not change across the three experiments. So why should we infer through the random coefficients logit that they do?
Experiment II: Normally Distributed Tastes and Rational Choice Behavior
Data Generation
In our second experiment, we relax the initial assumptions by supposing that tastes are normally distributed across individuals in the population. Although this assumption makes it more difficult to summarize the choice behavior of different individuals, it is done to address concerns that might arise about the simplicity of a two-segment model or about the assumption of a continuous distribution of tastes when the true distribution is discrete. 
The true tastes of individuals in this population are depicted in the upper left-hand panel of Figure   2 . The individual who values lighter MacBooks most would need a 2.09 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight, whereas the individual who values faster MacBooks most would need only a 0.08 GHz increase in processor speed.
Next, we determine the individual choice probabilities. In condition A, we do so by assuming that individuals make choices according to a multinomial logit model. In conditions B and C, we assume the probability that an individual chooses a lighter or a faster MacBook does not depend on how the alternatives are presented in the choice set, just as we did in experiment I. Finally, we simulate choices based on the individual choice probabilities. Table 5 contains a summary of the observed choices. Since individuals are assumed to behave rationally in this experiment, we would expect the population's choices to reveal a consistent set of preferences across the three conditions. This is observed in the data. For example, the population's choices should reveal a preference for the faster MacBook in choice set (viii), and its observed market share is 62.2%, 62.5% and 62.2% across the three choice sets.
Model and Results
We report the population-level regression results in Table 6 . Even though we observe individuals behaving rationally across the three choice sets, we infer through the random coefficients logit that their tastes have changed. In Data Set A, the random coefficients logit is able to recover the population's tastes for weight and speed. By assumption, an individual with average tastes would need a 0.33 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight. The random coefficients logit implies that an individual with average tastes would need a 0.33 GHz increase.
When the random coefficients logit is estimated on the other data sets, it implies that the individuals' preferences have changed. In Data Set B, the random coefficients logit underestimates the individual tastes for lighter weights. It implies that an individual with average tastes would need only a 0.13 Even though we allow for a continuous distribution of tastes, the same troubling problem occurs in this experiment as did in the last. We observe individuals making a consistent set of choices across the three data sets, so it would seem logical to infer that their preferences have not changed. Yet the random coefficients logit leads us to the opposite conclusion.
Implications for Policy Analysis
Prior research [e.g. Brownstone and Train, 1999, pp. 126-127] has qualitatively discussed the substitution patterns implied by the random coefficients logit when similar alternatives are added to the choice set, but a complete quantitative analysis has yet to be completed. In this section, we remedy this issue by simulating the market shares predicted by the random coefficients logit in this choice experiment. It could be the case the the random coefficients logit leads us to reasonable market share predictions even though the taste estimates are biased, but we show that this does not happen. In fact, the problems caused by the biased parameter estimates compound upon themselves in counterfactual analysis.
Consider a situation in which Apple is deciding whether to change the way it displays the MacBook in its retail stores. For the sake of discussion, suppose that Apple currently displays a 3 lb, 2.0
GHz MacBook and a 6 lb, 3.0 GHz MacBook on its shelf, and it is wondering what would happen to the market shares if a perfect substitute for either product were added to the display. Given the observed choice behavior (choice set iv in Table 5 ), a good model would imply that the overall market shares remain 50%-50% no matter how the alternatives are displayed. Table 7 summarizes the predicted market shares for the three potential displays. Each model does reasonably well in predicting the market shares for choice sets that are observed in the data. Looking down the diagonal of the the table, the random coefficients logit estimated on Data Set A predicts the market share of the lighter alternative to be 49.6% if the choice set {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed. Likewise, the model estimated on Data Set B predicts the market share of the lighter alternative to be 43.3% if {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed, and the model estimated on Data Set C predicts it to be 57.1% if {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed.
Nevertheless, each model produces very skewed predictions when applied to choice sets that are not observed in the data. For example, when estimated on Data Set A, the random coefficients logit predicts the market share of the lighter alternative to be 65.2% if {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed and 34.1% if {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed.
The random coefficients logit skews the market share prediction even further when estimated on the other data sets. For example, when estimated on Data Set B, the random coefficients logit predicts the market share of the lighter alternative to be 17.2% if the choice set {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed. This occurs because the choice set considered in the counterfactual situation is even more different than the one observed in the data. A similar statement can be made about the model estimated on Data Set C. It predicts the market share of the lighter alternative to be 83.2% if {(3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (3 lbs, 2.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)} is displayed.
Substitution Patterns
We may wonder why these implications have not been noticed before. One reason is that substantive interest often centers around population-level results, and the random coefficients logit does produce population-level results that more closely match our intuition than the homogeneous logit does. As Theorem 2 asserts, the random coefficients logit must result in disproportionate substitution among market shares. Nevertheless, this does not imply that the population-level results are correct.
To quantify this idea, we compare the substitution patterns predicted by the random coefficients logit against two standards: the rational substitution patterns that were assumed to create the data and the proportional substitution patterns that would be predicted by a logit model. The statistic that we use to quantify the difference between these patterns is the following substitution ratio:
where S existing|{original} is the market share of the pre-existing substitute in the original choice set, S existing|{expanded} is the share of the pre-existing substitute in the expanded choice set, and S incoming|{expanded} is the share of the incoming alternative in the expanded choice set. This statistic is analogous to the substitution ratio proposed in Steenburgh [2008] . It answers the question, "what proportion of the demand for the incoming alternative has been drawn from its pre-existing perfect substitute?" Table 7 .) The right-hand side considers what happens when a high-speed substitute is added (Choice Set 1 becomes Choice Set 3).
We calculate the value of the three ratios as follows: If the population behaves rationally, all of the demand for the incoming MacBook would be drawn from its pre-existing substitute. Thus, rational substitution would imply a ratio of 100%. This is what the model should predict given how individuals actually behave in the observed data.
If the population were to exhibit proportional substitution, the substitution ratio would simply be the market share of the perfect substitute in the two-alternative choice set. For example, working with the market shares in Table 7 , if the random coefficients logit is estimated on Data Set A, the market share of the lighter MacBook is predicted to be 49.6% in Choice Set 1. Thus, proportional substitution would imply that 49.6% of the incoming MacBook's market share is drawn from its pre-existing substitute. This is the standard typically used to compare results.
Finally, we calculate the substitution ratio implied by the random coefficients logit. Continuing with Data Set A, the random coefficients logit predicts that the market share of the lightweight MacBook is 49.6% in Choice Set 1. The combined market share of the lightweight MacBooks in the expanded choice set is 65.2%, so the market share of each alternative is 32.6%. Thus, the random coefficients logit implies that (49.6−32.6) /32.6 = 52.1% of the incoming MacBook's market share is drawn from its pre-existing substitute. should be happening in the data, at least if the researcher chose to look at close instead of perfect substitutes. As a consequence of Theorem 2, we know that the researcher would always reach this conclusion.
Nevertheless, Table 8 also shows that the random coefficients logit is not a completely flexible model. The model never predicts the actual substitution patterns that exist in the data, as it never results in a substitution ratio of 100%. Furthermore, the predicted substitution patterns, like the predicted market shares, depend on how the alternatives are displayed in the data. When estimated on Data Set B, the random coefficients logit predicts that only 32.0% of the incoming lightweight MacBook's market share would be drawn from its pre-existing substitute. When estimated on Data Set C, it predicts that 72.8% would be drawn. When the predicted market shares are lower, the substitution ratio is lower too because the random coefficients logit implies that each individual exhibits proportional substitution even if the population as a whole does not.
Experiment III: Normally Distributed Tastes and IIA Choice Behavior
If the random coefficients logit cannot recover rational substitution patterns, we may wonder what it is able to recover. In this section, we discuss what happens when the random coefficients logit is estimated on data in which individuals behave with IIA.
Data Generation
In the final experiment, we keep the assumption that tastes are normally distributed across individuals, but we modify the procedure by assuming that individuals behave with IIA instead of behaving rationally. Specifically, we begin by assuming that individuals have the same tastes as they do in the previous experiment.
Then, we determine the choice probabilities by assuming that each individual makes decisions according to a multinomial logit under every condition. For example, suppose an individual has tastes for weight and speed of {-1 /3, 1} and faces the alternatives in choice set (iv). In condition A, when the individual faces a choice between {(3 lbs, 2 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)}, we would determine the choice probabilities to be { 1 /2, 1 /2}. In condition B, when the individual faces a decision among {(3 lbs, 2 GHz), (3 lbs, 2 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)}, we would determine the choice probabilities to be
. In condition C, when the individual faces a decision among {(3 lbs, 2 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz), (6 lbs, 3.0 GHz)}, we would determine the choice probabilities to be { 1 /3, 1 /3, 1 /3}. In contrast to the previous experiments, the probability of choosing either a lighter or a faster MacBook now depends on how the alternatives are presented in the choice set. The individual would choose a lighter MacBook with probabilities 1 /2, 2 /3, and 1 /3 across the three experiments.
Finally, we simulate choices based on the individual choice probabilities. These choices are summarized in Table 9 . The population's choices suggest that individuals' have context-dependent preferences. This is not surprising given that individuals are assumed to behave with IIA. Consider choice set (iv). In condition A, the market share of the lighter alternative is 49.9%, so the observed choices suggest the population is indifferent between a lighter and a faster MacBook. In condition B, its market share is 65.9%, so the observed choices suggest the population prefers a lighter MacBook.
In condition C, its market share is 33.5%, so the observed choices suggest the population prefers a faster MacBook.
Model and Results
To infer the individuals' tastes from their observed choices, we estimate the random coefficients logit specified in equation (17). We report the population-level regression results in Table 10 . In contrast to the previous two experiments, the random coefficients logit model is able to recover the assumed parameters under every condition. From this we would infer that the individuals' preferences are the same across the three conditions. The model implies that an individual with average tastes would need a 0.33 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight under condition A, a 0.34 GHz increase under B, and a 0.33 GHz increase under C. This is in stark contrast to the preferences found in experiment II.
We show the individual-level parameter estimate graphically in Figure 3 . On the other hand, our experimental results lead to the following paradox: If individuals actually do behave rationally, the data will suggest that their preferences remain constant across the three
conditions. Yet, when we estimate the random coefficients logit on these data, we will infer that their tastes have changed. In experiment II, the population chooses a lightweight MacBook 9,080, 9,044 and 9,053 times out of 18,000 occasions across the three conditions, yet the model implies that an individual with average tastes would need a 0.33, 0.13 and 0.91 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight.
Conversely, if individuals actually do behave with IIA, the data will suggest that their preferences are context-dependent. Yet, when we estimate the random coefficients logit on these data, we will infer that their tastes remain the same. In experiment III, the population chooses a lightweight MacBook 8,896, 11,853 and 6,120 times out of 18,000 occasions across the three conditions, yet the model implies that an individual with average tastes would need a 0.33, 0.34 and 0.33 GHz increase in processor speed to compensate for a 1 lb increase in weight.
Conclusion
We show that the random coefficients logit imposes restrictions on individual and population choice behavior. These restrictions do not merely limit the range of substitution patterns that can be recovered in empirical analysis. Rather, they raise basic questions about what it means when we say that the random coefficients logit can recover an individual's preferences from their observed choices. Why would we infer that individuals' preferences depend on the presentation of the choice set unless we observe their choices to be changing across presentations?
Why are these fundamental properties not obvious? One reason is that substantive interest often centers around population-level results, and the random coefficients logit produces population-level results that are more in line with our prior expectations than the homogeneous logit does. Ecological correlations are found in the composite random utilities and disproportional substitution must occur among market shares. Nevertheless, as we show through cross-level inference, this does not mean that the results are correct and that the model can be used to conduct policy experiments.
Another reason is that the nature of the problem has been misunderstood. Many choice models have been proposed with the goal of breaking IIA. But why? Simply breaking IIA, either at the individual or at the population level, does not imply either that the similarity critique [Debreu, 1960] has been addressed or that the model is a good model. The real goal should be to build models that
help us understand what observed choices reveal about individual preferences. If we presume that individuals could behave rationally, then the model should at least allow it as a possibility.
A final reason is that the problem is difficult. King [1997] made a significant contribution to the related problem of ecological inference more than seventy-five years after Ogburn and Goltra [1919] identified it and forty-five years after Robinson [1950] made it well known. In the interim, many scholars wrote fruitfully on the topic, while others suggested either that the problem did not exist or that it was folly to try and solve it [King, 1997, p. 6 ]. Perhaps we should expect there is more to learn.
The heart of the matter is that IIA is an assumption about how an individual substitutes among alternatives. Concerns about it cannot be addressed by allowing for differences in tastes across individuals. 
